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La Doctrine in Denial and the Missing Distributive
Analysis
This symposium addresses the alternatives to the neoliberal paradigm that once
globalized by the Washington consensus has been accused by scholars to be at
the core of all injustices especially in economic, criminal, consumer law and even
behind the rule of law crisis in Europe. Many authors who have been thinking how
the neoliberal paradigm is embedded in legal regimes have written in the Law
of Political Economy by showing along a U.S. and European CLS tradition how
law and political economy are mutually constituted in a variety of fields such as
jurisprudence, international, administrative, private law and through an array of
theoretical approaches in legal scholarship or la doctrine.
Poul F. Kjaer, the editor of the volume, maps the masters of law and political
economy evolving from different political and methodological traditions and re-
positions them along an elegant dichotomy between holism and differentiation. The
politics of law change in Kjaer’s chapter alongside the history and political phases
that follow in the wake of WWI, characterized by corporatism, neo-corporatism and
governance, in its neoliberal flavor, influencing styles and discourses of la doctrine.
The rest of the volume takes a post-WWII and post-integration through law approach
that is in tension with those scholars who aimed at securing a supranational legal
order through good governance and constitutionalism under a quasi-federal structure
led by a technocratic Commission and an heroic European Court of Justice with a
limited focus on political economy and the entrenchment of the neoliberal paradigm
in law.
Distributional Struggles
For instance, David Kennedy’s contribution sheds light on how international and
European legal elites innocently concealed distributional struggles in name of order,
governance, judicialization and balancing between neoliberalism and solidarity.
Christian Joerges and Michelle Everson recall in their chapter how the legal
dimension of the economic constitution was re-defined by a “very German” political
and methodological struggle between the Hayekian Ernst-Joachim Mestmäcker
and the unorthodox progressive Rudolf Wiethölter, both carrying on their shoulders
the legacy of the ordo-liberal school of Franz Böhm. The politics of European
private law, as Hans Micklitz recalls in his apologetic contribution, were influenced
by the changes in the political economy of the Community: by the late 1970s
the welfare states of the Member States had become the target of the “failure
rhetoric” by neoliberal politics, but many progressive scholars still believed in a
powerful comeback of Social Europe. Differently from European labor law where, as
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Stefano Giubboni shows, the reconfiguration of the struggle of capital versus labor
happened at the expense of the latter, especially in the “weaker Member States
of the Eurozone,” European consumer law was more complex and layered due to
the resurgence of Social Europe in the 1990s and the neoliberal turn of the Lisbon
agenda in 2000.
Marija Bartl’s chapter depicts powerfully these competing socio-economic
imaginaries in EU private law shifting from social to neoliberal visions pursuing
different legal agendas put forward by the Commission. Until 2010, when the
neoliberal turn in EU policies became the orthodoxy, vague legal concepts based
on fairness and efficiency, rather than distributive consequences, kept the dream of
Social Europe alive. Duncan Kennedy’s hermeneutic of suspicion in contemporary
legality highlights how scholars, just like corporate lawyers or judges, were abusing
the legal method to achieve their political agendas without openly engaging with the
distributive consequences of legal reforms.
The oscillation between a social or a neoliberal paradigm in law as it appears
prominently in this volume brings me back to my dissertation years when, between
Trento (Italy) and Cambridge (U.S.), I was trying to map the role of la doctrine in
the political economy of EU consumer law from the mid-1980s to the late 2000s.
Following the Single European Act of 1986, the European Community was rushing
towards the completion of the Single Market through numerous harmonization
directives which led to battles by lobbies and Member States’ representatives in
Brussels, followed by the interpretative struggles before the European Court of
Justice in Luxembourg amplifying the claims of Euro-Lawyers and domestic judges
shaping the field of EU law. But my puzzlement was always: where were European
and private law scholars while these struggles were taking place in Brussels,
Luxembourg and Barcelona? Perhaps rather than on the battleground, legal scholars
were still, per Von Jhering’s image, in a dreamed-up heaven of legal concepts, or
worse, were in denial on how law and political economy operated on the ground.
The Lack of a Distributive Analysis in EU Consumer
Protection Law
The paradox at the heart of my doctoral research was the lack of a distributive
analysis in the doctrinal work on consumer protection at a time when the field
was shifting rapidly from the domestic to the European level with enormous but
unaddressed distributive effects. My hunch was that scholars were caught in their
ideological division between efficiency versus social goals, maximum versus minimal
harmonization and neoliberalism versus welfarism in a way that continued to ignore
the distributive effects of consumer law. They would set aside distribution either
under cover of a meaningless general formula such as unfairness in consumer
contracts or, later on, through the turn to human rights and the constitutionalization
of private law. Additionally, these scholars were advocating market efficiency
by importing, as part of their dream, U.S. mainstream law and economics, all
while losing sight of the legal strategies that corporate lobbyist in Brussels were
advocating for with devastating outcomes for consumer protection. While corporate
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lobbyists successfully managed to dilute the products liability directive based on
efficiency, autonomy and equal protection for producers’ rhetoric, progressive
scholars appeared blind to this development because of their faith in Social Europe
and their vague notions of fairness. My critique of these doctrinal approaches
grappling with social, ordo-liberal or law and economics schools of thought was
that they were out of sync with the distributive effects of the existing European
consumer law. In contrast with corporate lobbyists, domestic judges and Euro-
lawyers embedded in the legal struggles for European consumer protection, scholars
were either pleasantly surprised or infuriated by the distributive consequences
arising from the implementation of the directives and the judgements of the ECJ.,
In my Transatlanticism article, I created a consumer protection test showing how
the European private law doctrine, relying only on the vague formula of “social-
market economy,” had completely missed the distributive consequence of European
consumer law. I constructed a formal analytic through historical and doctrinal
comparisons of U.S. and EU consumer law. My encounter with distribution in U.S.
consumer protection combined two critiques of EU consumer law scholarship. The
first one was a critique of fairness, as the protection of the weaker party, promoted
by progressive scholars. The second one was a critique of efficiency, promoted
by neoliberal and anti-dogmatic scholars who were selectively receiving U.S.
mainstream law and economics out of context. My distributive analytic engaged
with two European directives on the liability for defective products (1985) and the
unfair contract terms directive (1993). During my doctoral research I found out that
European scholarship on both directives was simply disengaged when addressing
their distributive effects on different consumer groups throughout the European
jurisdictions.
The basic idea was to show how changes in legal regimes embedded in the
European political economy had distributive consequences that were often counter
intuitive and unevenly impacted consumers in Spain, Denmark, France or Germany
due to mobilization of domestic judges in Spain or the existence of different public
health regimes throughout the EU Member States. Let me explain in three steps how
my irreverent distributive analytic provided a timely critique of European scholarship
on consumer law and policy.
Denial of the Distributive Analysis
My first step was a critique of the la doctrine and the fact that scholars addressing
consumer protection were in denial because they suppressed any overt discussion
of the distributive dimension of European consumer law. The thinking on distribution
in EU consumer protection law began with a well-documented argument that there
was nothing about distribution in a field such as consumer law, which desperately
needed it. The two dominant ideals motivating the academic discipline were
fairness and efficiency, but once elevated at the European level, consumer law
became overtly a-political like a panacea for the struggle between producers versus
consumers. The potentially acrimonious battles between scholars committed to a
‘social’ market for the EU and those pursuing the objective of a ‘free’ market gave
way to a truce in the name of a politically undefined EU consumer law. In the hands
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of the clever and technocratic Commission, EU consumer law became a coherent
project about consumers as a collective identity who were able to move and shop
across borders. The scholarly denial of any distributive implication went hand-in-
hand with the ability of academics to dismiss the issue of winners and losers among
different consumer groups, different social classes, men and women, northerners
and southerners, or the rich and the poor.
Recognition of the Distributive Analysis
The second step in my analytic was to map how the idea that distribution was
gradually entering the discourse of private law scholars and yet, at the same time,
nothing like a rigorous distributive analysis was emerging. During this time, la
doctrine was either still in the heaven of legal concepts or in denial because fairness
or efficiency carried absolutely no distributive analysis in practice. Among these
academics, Thierry Bourgoignie, who had studied with Arthur Leff at Yale Law
school, one of the first critics of mainstream law and economics, in 1984 alongside
David Trubek published a book that sketched what they called a “modern political
economy approach to consumer protection”. Bourgoignie and Trubek focused
predominantly on federalism rather than distribution and lamented the lack of a Ralf
Nader in European academic circles. Bourgoignie also advocated for the creation of
a collective identity of European consumers while also being involved in the drafting
of the EC directive on liability for defective products. Although he was obviously
aware of the progressive distributive consequences of this directive, this did not
stop the corporate lobbies, empowered by the 1980s market integration rhetoric
and fearful of U.S. class actions, to water down some of the key provisions of the
directive, allowing for scientific and privity of contract exceptions. Not surprisingly,
when transposed into the domestic private law regimes, the EC product liability
directive created, as anticipated by Daniela Caruso, national resistance among
domestic private law elites. And again unsurprisingly, Hugh Collins, who had rejected
the pervasiveness of the rule of law rhetoric obscuring class domination, was one
among the few progressive scholars disenchanted by the EU unfair contract terms
directive. Yet Collins’ main contribution only entailed the abandoning of a procedural
vision of distributive justice in contract law in favor of a substantive one which
contained no distributive analysis. Finally, the slow reception of mainstream U.S. law
and economics in European scholarship through comparative law led some scholars
to reject the “forced harmonization” of European contract law, not because of a
distributive analytic but rather a blind faith in autonomy, efficiency and subsidiarity.
To my dismay, scholarship by the fathers and mothers of consumer law lacked a
robust matrix addressing the distributive outcome of European consumer law, and
this was so striking I offered a sharp critique on how the academic consumer law
discourse merely ignored distribution as a whole.
Application of the Distributive Analysis
The third step, an applied illustration of my analytic, proved inevitable. As time
passed, the uneven enforcement of the two harmonizing consumer directives made
their regressive and progressive distributive consequences more visible. As to the
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progressive effects, the unfair contract terms directive’s vague fairness criteria
allowed a judge of first instance in Barcelona to make some initial distributive moves.
When a case concerning an unfair term in the standard contract for the sale of an
encyclopedia reached the European Court of Justice, the Spanish and European
judiciary ushered in unexpected progressive distributive consequences. This led to
a second life in protecting consumers against the Spanish mortgage defaults after
the 2008 financial crisis. As to the regressive effects, the products liability directive,
which included carve-outs, requested on grounds of efficiency by producers and
corporate lobbies, allowed both national and EU courts to take away certain forms of
consumer protection. For instance, harm from defective products including infected
blood, depending on the types of public health regimes in the Member States, could
leave consumers without public redress or private damages as it had happened in
Spain but not in Germany.
Step by step, this analytic framework allowed me to interpret the changes in law
and political economy brought about by EU consumer protection by anticipating the
possible distributive consequences of the two directives. Despite the indeterminacy
of legal norms, what was at stake was the doctrinal denial that either fairness or
efficiency could be used to predict the distributive effects of EU consumer protection.
And such distributive effects could have not been anticipated without taking into
consideration the political conjunctions of Social Europe and the neoliberal turn
of the Lisbon agenda, as well as the mobilization of the corporate lobbyists in
Brussels and the domestic judges in Southern Europe. If the lobbyists and the
judges knew very well what they were doing, la doctrine was in denial. While other
actors struggled, driven by their interests and beliefs, to shape and interpret the text
of the directives, the doctrine kept on dreaming. In their dreams, European scholars
could not and would not engage with the distributive consequences of the directives,
except when the wakeup call was: “you are hurting the people you are trying to help”,
meaning that the poor had been injured by EU consumer protection.
Law and the Neoliberal Paradigm
Through these three steps consisting in denial, recognition and application of
the distributive analysis, I showed how the powerful phenomenon of denial of la
doctrine, stuck in a neoliberal or social paradigm, could survive untouched during the
Europeanization of consumer law. This denial did not mean that scholars were not
aware of distributive effects in EU consumer law, but that they could not fully engage
with these effects as that would reveal they were playing another game, a political
game on the ground that domestic judges and corporate lobbies were fully engaged
with.
In mapping the interaction between law and political economy it becomes clear
that the neoliberal paradigm is still pervasive in law, especially in competition law,
private administrative law and natural resource extractions. Rather than addressing
what comes after neoliberalism, as a paradigm shift, I would suggest that scholars
engage with a more rigorous distributive analysis grounded in empirical findings
through which they can grasp whether the oscillation between neoliberal and social
paradigms in law produces the proclaimed distributive consequences.
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